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The unspoken side of mutual adjustment: Understanding intersubjective negotiation 
in small professional service firms
Abstract
Employment relationships and practices in small firms are generally acknowledged to 
be ad hoc, contested and negotiated, producing ‘mutual adjustment’ between owner-
managers  and  employees.  Drawing  on  detailed  qualitative  empirical  material  from 
three small professional service firms, we argue that the explicit instances of formal or 
informal  negotiation  that  influence  mutual  adjustment  cannot  be  understood  as 
discrete  events  disassociated  from  ongoing,  everyday  intersubjective  negotiations. 
Mutual adjustment is founded in a largely unspoken, intersubjective guessing game 
that  becomes  particularly  crucial  in  the  ambiguity-intensive  nature  of  small 
professional  service  firms  where  organizational  realities  are  particularly  prone  to 
idiosyncratic  (mis)interpretation.  The  intersubjective  guesswork  underlying  mutual 
adjustment is potentially dysfunctional as outcomes arise that satisfy neither owner-
manager  nor  employee  interests.  We  suggest  that  understanding  employment 
relationships in small professional service firms requires greater focus on the study of 
individuals’ perceptions and the ways in which their relative positions are structured in 
intersubjective mutual (mis)recognition.
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Introduction
Analysis  of  employment  relationships  in  small  firms  has  advanced  beyond  crude 
polarizations of ‘small is beautiful’ or ‘bleak house’ perspectives (Ram and Edwards, 
2003) to recognize that relations between owner-managers and employees are  the 
product of ongoing negotiations and processes of  mutual adjustment (Holliday, 1995; 
Moule, 1998; Ram, 1994, 1999a). Mutual adjustment refers to the ways in which both 
owner-managers  and  their  employees  accommodate,  adapt  to  and,  potentially, 
struggle with one another to develop working practices and employment relationships. 
Importantly,  this  acknowledges  that  employees  are  not  ‘passive  recipients  of 
management  control’  (Ram  and  Edwards,  2003:  722)  but  are  involved  in  ongoing 
processes of (re)negotiation and adaptation.  Small  professional service firms (sPSFs) 
provide  a  valuable  focus  for  this  debate  because  of  the  high  degrees  of 
interdependency  between  dominant  owner-managers  and  valuable  specialist 
employees (Messersmith and Wales, 2011; Tam et al., 2002) that can potentially lead 
to  greater  degrees  of  mutual  adjustment  in  their  employment  relationships  (Ram, 
1999a).  However,  the  concept  of  mutual  adjustment  remains  relatively 
underdeveloped in this context. 
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While studies of small firms have distinguished between and examined the formal and 
informal  nature  of  negotiation  shaping  employment  relationships  and  working 
practices (Marlow et al., 2010) there has been limited exploration of the processes that 
may underlie (and potentially undermine) this negotiation. Utilizing detailed qualitative 
empirical  material  from  three  sPSFs,  this  paper  develops  the  concept  of  mutual 
adjustment  to  help  understand ‘the  often  opaque  and  complex  internal  dynamics’ 
(Ram and Edwards, 2003: 727) of small firms’ employment relationships. Our findings 
suggest that explicit instances of formal or informal negotiation cannot be understood 
as  discrete  events  disassociated  from  ongoing,  everyday,  intersubjective  forms  of 
negotiation. These negotiations have important consequences for the organization as 
their  development  can  become  potentially  dysfunctional  and  outcomes  arise  that 
satisfy neither owner-manager nor employee interests.
Literature Review
Employment relationships in small firms
Regarded as informal adhocracies (Mintzberg, 1980), small firms are often considered 
to  be  dominated  by  the  interests  and  goals  of  owner-managers.  The  same  close 
physical  proximity  and  interpersonal  contact  that  breeds  informality  (Bacon  and 
Hoque,  2005;  Ram and Edwards,  2003)  can  also increase  opportunities  for  owner-
managers  to  exert  their  influence  (Jennings  and Beaver,  1997).  These  close  social-
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working  relationships  allow  some  scope  for  employer  and  employee  needs  to  be 
accommodated,  for  example  employees  may be granted flexibility  around working-
hours in return for effort or task flexibility (Nadin and Cassell, 2007; Tsai et al., 2007),  
creating ongoing, everyday processes of negotiation.
Traditional  polarizations of  ‘small  is  beautiful’  or  ‘bleak house’  approaches to small 
firms  (Ram  and  Edwards,  2003)  have  been  criticized  for  failing  to  pay  sufficient 
attention  to  the  way  employment  relationships  might  feature  a  combination  of 
conjunctive and disjunctive interests (Marlow and Patton, 2002). This reflects a need 
for a more balanced, context-sensitive understanding of the nuances of employment 
relationships  in  small  firms  (Blackburn,  2005;  Harney  and  Dundon,  2006).  While 
external influences and sectoral factors interact with the internal firm environment to 
shape and potentially constrain employment relationships (Barrett, 1999; Barrett and 
Rainnie, 2002; Rainnie, 1989), they are not deterministic (Jansen et al., 2011). Those 
inside the organization must make sense of these factors and neither owner-managers 
nor their employees are passive in this interpretation (Arrowsmith et al., 2003; Gilman 
and Edwards,  2008;  Ram,  1994).  It  is  this  negotiation of  employment relationships 
within the firm that is the focus of the present study.
The role of mutual adjustment
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Laying  emphasis  on  informal  communication  between  actors,  Mintzberg  (1980) 
proposed ‘mutual adjustment’ as a reflection of the control of working practices by the 
‘doers’. Workers in small firms are not powerless in the face of management interests 
(Ram and Edwards, 2003) but may draw on various resources to actively ‘bargain’ with 
their employers. Employment relationships and working practices in small  firms are 
significantly influenced by such bargaining, of give and take between managers and 
employees.  These  ongoing,  everyday  interactions  produce  forms  of  mutual 
accommodation, adaptation and struggle (Holliday, 1995; Ram, 1994) and, as order is 
negotiated  in  an  informal  environment  characterized  by  close  spatial  and  social 
proximity,  this  is  unlikely  to  derive  solely  from  formalized  management  strategies 
(Nadin  and  Cassell,  2007;  Ram,  1994;  Verreynne  et  al.,  2011).  Mutual  adjustment 
therefore  suggests  a  more  nuanced  understanding  of  the  informally  negotiated 
working relationship of everyday organizational life (Ram, 1999b). 
Classic ethnographic studies of SMEs have highlighted the significance of this internal 
negotiation of social relations and the prominence of informality (Holliday, 1995; Ram, 
1994). Working practices and employment relationships in small firms are complex and 
heterogeneous  (Rainnie,  1991)  involving  improvised,  ad  hoc  solutions  and 
compromises,  producing  particular,  unwritten  practices,  routines  and  tacit 
understandings (Brown, et al.,  2010; Ram et al.,  2001). These processes of informal 
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negotiation  produce  forms  of  mutual  adjustment (Goffee  and  Scase,  1995;  Ram, 
1999a) that we suggest can be particularly heightened in sPSFs.
The distinctive case of small PSFs
We suggest that sPSFs represent a potentially fruitful avenue for investigating forms of 
employer-employee negotiation. Whilst retaining many of the features of small firms, 
for  example  around  close  physical  and  social  proximity  and  informality,  sPSFs  also 
exhibit  many of  the distinct  features associated with larger  PSFs.  For  example,  the 
influential  position  of  highly-skilled  or  specialist  employees  who  work  closely  with 
clients can be central to the success of these organizations, granting them a relatively 
strong  position  from  which  to  negotiate  their  employment  relationships  and  exert 
influence on the development and growth of the firm  (Behrends, 2007;  Ram, 1999a, 
1999b).  Employment  relationships  in  sPSFs  are  therefore  characterized  by  ‘the 
necessity  of  balancing  the  pressures  for  organizational  efficiency  with  the  need to 
harness  the  entrepreneurial  facilities  of  key  staff  [which]  tends  towards  more 
contingent and fluid approaches to labour’ (Ram, 1999a: 28). 
Employment  practices  can  be  used  to  moderate  these  relationships  (Boxall  and 
Steeneveld,  1999;  Tam  et  al.,  2002)  and  more  sophisticated  practices  have  been 
identified in specialist small firms than in other SMEs (Brown et al., 2010; Dietz et al.,  
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2006). However, with room for worker discretion and a potential lack of managerial 
expertise, there remains a need for consent to be negotiated (Ram, 1994, 1999b). The 
negotiation of employment relationships and working practices in sPSFs is therefore 
characterized by the interdependence and potential conflict between central owner-
managers  and  valuable,  influential  specialist  workers.  It  is  this  ongoing,  everyday 
negotiation that produces potentially distinctive forms of mutual adjustment. However, 
the  development  of  working  practices  and  employment  relationships  in  sPSFs  and 
other  small,  knowledge-intensive  organizations  remain  relatively  under-researched, 
despite their importance for many economies (Ram and Edwards, 2010).
Mutual adjustment and intersubjectivity
In the small firm context, the importance of mutual adjustment is developed from a 
perspective on the negotiated order that reflects the relative importance of factors 
such as external environment and individual characteristics as well as both formal and 
informal negotiations (Ram, 1994: 5). We suggest that there is a further, internally held 
influence of  individual  (mis)perceptions  that  underlies (and potentially  undermines) 
this negotiated order and the mutual adjustment that reflects it. Recent discussions of 
employment relationships in small firms have focused on forms of informality but not 
on the unspoken influences that determine forms of accommodation and adaptation. 
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We  suggest  the  relevance  of  intersubjectivity  as  a  useful  conception  for  informal, 
(partially) unacknowledged forms of negotiation in small firms.
Intersubjectivity  is  derived  from  the  particularly  interactional  infrastructure  of 
organizations  in  which  individuals  seek  to  understand  others,  to  make  themselves 
understood and to  hold one another  accountable  for  these  understandings  (Reich, 
2010). It has therefore been suggested as useful for understanding organizational life 
(Eden et al., 1981) and management, as a mediating influence in these processes of 
mutual understanding and interpretation (Hancock and Tyler, 2001). It is in asserting a 
perception of others that one takes up a position and an identity of one’s own and 
intersubjectivity  therefore  provides  a  means  of  understanding  how  individuals 
(differently) construe power and predict the behaviour of powerful others, their values 
and intentions (Jones, 1984). It is in this unchoreographed dance of interpretation and 
prediction that norms can develop in work groups (Eden et al.,  1981) and that non-
vocal  coordination  of  organizational  environments  and  practices  can  take  place 
(Schegloff,  1992).  We propose that  this  type of  mutual  recognition is  an important 
factor underlying the processes of mutual adjustment in small firms.
In  particular,  while  studies  of  small  firms  have  examined  the  informal  nature  of 
negotiation shaping employment relationships (Holliday, 1995) there has been limited 
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attention  given  to  illuminating  other  ways  in  which  employment  relationships  and 
working practices might develop. The potential role of intersubjectivity in these distinct 
contexts has yet to be explored. However, the reliance of owner-managers on their 
personal  assessments  (Nooteboom,  1988),  discussions  of  tacit  understanding  and 
knowledge management (Edwards, 2007; Edwards et al., 2007; Yu, 2009) and the role 
of  individual  subjectivity  in  relational  development  (Jayasinghe  et  al.,  2008)  have 
suggested something of the idea’s relevance. Intersubjectivity has also allowed Sharifi 
and Zhang (2009) to draw out the relative unimportance of truth in the negotiation of 
organizational  definitions,  broadly  in  line  with  considerations  of  SMEs  as  shared 
communities of meaning (Rigg, 2005).
Our paper sets out to explore the ways in which ongoing, everyday negotiations may 
manifest  in  sPSFs  with  a  view  to  developing  our  understanding  of  the  processes 
underlying mutual adjustment. We will discuss our research findings in terms of the 
potential  tensions  between  central,  dominant  owner-managers  and  influential 
specialist workers and how the processes underlying mutual adjustment cope with and 
accommodate these tensions on an everyday basis. Intersubjective negotiation is then 
discussed  in  relation  to  mutual  adjustment  and  its  impact  in  sPSFs.  We  will  first 
describe the method we adopted for our exploratory research. 
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Method
Our  study  was  focused  on  investigating  working  practices  and  employment 
relationships in sPSFs. Our qualitative multiple case-study research strategy (Yin, 2003) 
enabled us to explore the relatively informal yet routine-based environments of SMEs 
(Scott et al., 1989) and understand employment practices and relationships in action. 
Getting close to the practice of employment relationships in SMEs reveals subtleties of  
employment relationships (Holliday, 1995; Ram, 1994) and in our study we became 
interested in the processes underlying mutual adjustment.
Three sPSFs were recruited as separate cases via purposive sampling. The firms, with 
fewer than 50 employees, were small (BERR, 2006) and corresponded to Morris and 
Empson’s (1998: 610) definition of PSFs as organizations trading on the ability of their  
human  capital  to  create  bespoke,  intangible  solutions  to  complex  client  problems. 
Despite  each  firm  possessing  relatively  sophisticated  formal  policies,  for  example 
evidenced  by  their  attainment  of  such  external  recognition  as  Investors  in  People 
accreditation, elements of their practices were conducted informally (Marlow et al., 
2010), not least owing to the intangible nature of the service work undertaken. 
The  organizations  provided  specialist  recruitment  (‘SciRec’,  a  scientific  industry 
recruitment  firm  and  ‘FinRec’,  a  financial  services  recruitment  firm)  and  design-
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communications  (‘ComCo’,  a  communications  consultancy)  services.  All  three  firms 
operated  as  niche  service  providers  to  small  numbers  of  clients  and  identified 
themselves as offering bespoke, specialist services that could be clearly distinguished 
from  more  common  ‘high-street’  providers.  Typically  all  had  low  turnover  rates, 
reflecting  owner-managers’  conception  of  the valued,  highly  skilled  nature  of  their 
employees. As well as the centrality of specialist work, the three firms had sufficient 
commonalities, such as owner-managers who had left large corporate environments to 
pursue similar  work  through their  own businesses  and a  reliance on  narrow client 
bases,  to  allow  meaningful  comparisons  to  be  drawn  between  their  employment 
relationships  and  working  practices  despite  their  different  sectors.  The  firms  were 
given pseudonyms to anonymize their identity.
Gathering empirical material
Detailed qualitative research was conducted in each company over an 18-month period 
by the paper’s first author. This comprised an initial on-site phase (phase one) at the 
company premises followed by telephone, email and some personal contact during an 
intervening period before a second significant phase on-site (phase two). In total the 
empirical  material  comprised  on-site  observations  (348  hours),  semi-structured 
interviews (x35) and company documentation (600 pages; see Appendix Table 1). The 
three sources of empirical material facilitated triangulation and built understanding to 
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inform the ongoing study (Denzin, 1970; Webb, 1970). Further, observations helped to 
gain a sense of the day-to-day practices in each firm and attending team meetings,  
coffee breaks and other events provided a sense of context while developing rapport 
between researcher and participants (Alvesson, 2011a). This informal interaction was 
supported by access to a broad range of documents such as employment contracts, 
values statements, general staff emails and other notices.
Care was taken to interview people across each firm to gain a rounded understanding 
of working lives. The semi-structured interviews typically lasted around 60 minutes, 
with  a  range  between  35  and  105  minutes,  often  depending  on  the  participants’ 
individual  approaches to  the  process.  All  interviews were structured  around topics 
including  recruitment  and selection,  training,  reward  and recognition,  performance 
appraisal and staff exit. These initial questions then allowed participants to relate their  
own  explanations  of  employment  relationships  and  working  practices,  descriptions 
that  were  subsequently  pursued by  the  interviewer.  Verbatim interview transcripts 
were produced in their entirety for phase one and for relevant sections in phase two to 
facilitate  subsequent  analysis  (e.g.  excluding  introductory  chat  and  unrelated 
digressions).
Analysis
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Drawing too-sharp a distinction between collection and analysis of qualitative empirical 
material can hinder the depth of a research study by closing-off lines of enquiry arising 
from emerging ideas and reflections (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser and Strauss, 1967). In 
light of  this,  interview tapes  were listened to within 24 hours of  the recording for 
points  of  interest  or  that  required  elaboration.  Subsequent,  close  readings  of  the 
empirical  material,  conducted  by  both  authors,  informed  ongoing  discussions  to 
develop a rich understanding of the organizations. 
Initial  reviews  of  the  empirical  material  collected  suggested  that  employment 
relationships  comprised  negotiations  on  many  topics  and  in  different  modes.  We 
organized our empirical  material  by coding instances in which one party’s  interests 
were (or were perceived by them to be) in negotiation or tension with another party’s. 
We  ordered  these  according  to  the  area  of  employment  relationship  in  which  it 
occurred,  for  example ‘salary  setting and review’.  For  each instance,  we noted the 
positions of the relevant parties and briefly described how the matter was resolved. 
Further, we were careful to draw on the longitudinal nature of our study and trace 
changing perceptions of  negotiation around issues such as payment structures that 
persisted throughout the study. Given the emergent nature of our codes, no formal 
testing was completed for agreement between the authors but a coding dictionary was 
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developed and discussed, disagreements being resolved by recourse to the empirical  
material.
The codes and relevant extracts of empirical material were analysed in light of existing 
literature on employment relationships and working practices in small firms and the 
nature of influence exerted by specialist employees, requiring frequent returns to the 
original empirical material as we explored the concepts developed. The negotiations 
identified  were  observed  to  take  very  different  forms.  Some  issues  were  resolved 
through  a  formal  negotiation  such  as  using  a  pay  review  meeting  to  discuss  an 
employee’s  salary  level  while  other  issues  were  addressed  through  informal 
negotiations, such as reminding staff of appropriate conduct towards colleagues in the 
office.  These  formal  and  informal  explicit  negotiations  fitted  with  our  existing 
understandings of mutual adjustment but there were other instances that departed 
from  established  literature.  These  were  occasions  in  which  research  participants 
described  changes  being  made  in  response  to  perceived,  but  as  yet  unrealised, 
pressures within the organization. In other words, while there was no apparent explicit 
negotiation, parties were altering their position in respect of another as if engaged in 
an  active  negotiation.  As  these  instances  emerged  from  our  findings,  we  were 
prompted to consider how these unspoken ‘negotiations’ informed the employment 
relationships in our participant firms. 
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Findings
In this section we will describe the dynamics of the mutual adjustment of employment 
relationships and working practices in each firm and discuss specific examples in detail.  
This is principally to suggest the unspoken, anticipatory processes underlying mutual 
adjustment  that  are  not  adequately  accounted  for  or  addressed  in  the  existing 
literature. Our findings are presented on a firm-by-firm basis to allow for a detailed 
description  of  the  context  and  (potential)  relationships  between different  areas  of 
negotiation, acknowledging that types of negotiation, for example in terms of relative 
degrees of informality, are not mutually exclusive (Marlow, et al., 2010).
All  three  firms  sought  to  grow  and  increase  the  degree  of  formality  in  their 
employment  relationships  and  business  processes  (Gilman  and  Edwards,  2008). 
Existing  employment  relationships,  contrary  to  observations  in  larger  PSFs,  had 
features  in  common  with  adhocratic,  informal  small  firms  governed  by  powerful, 
central  owner-managers.  However,  the  characterization  of  specialist  workers  as 
important to the organizations was also common to all three firms.
ComCo
ComCo Limited is a broad-based communications consultancy offering public relations 
(PR),  strategic  marketing,  design and internal  communications services.  ComCo was 
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incorporated  in  2001,  almost  four  years  prior  to  the  first  research visit.  The  three 
founding directors, Patrick, Roger and Steve, had previously worked at the same large 
company  and  were  later  joined  by  Eddie,  one  of  Roger’s  former  colleagues,  who 
became  a  junior  director  alongside  Steve.  Including  the  hands-on  directors,  the 
business employs 14 people, divided between PR/communications professionals (x6), 
the growing design team (x5) and a small sales team (x3). Although initially focused on 
providing these services to SMEs and public sector organizations, as part of its growth 
strategy ComCo later attracted more lucrative and demanding private-sector clients. 
The business also changed in other ways during the study, including Patrick’s exit and 
Roger taking a majority stake, increasing his already significant influence across the 
firm.
The nature of mutual adjustment at ComCo combined formal, informal and ‘unspoken’ 
forms of  negotiation as  well  as  resistance.  A central  force in the everyday working 
relations is derived from Roger informally asserting control, not only on the employees 
but also his fellow directors. He is the centre of the office (and the organization) with 
most PR work going through him. When out of the office Roger maintains his centrality, 
making regular calls throughout the day for short briefings and follow-ups. 
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Accommodation and adaptation in practices is illustrated in the case of consultants’ 
pay.  When Laura joined ComCo she was paid what Patrick admitted was a ‘very low’ 
wage but with a contractual promise to review the amount after three and six months. 
Laura reported that the company had honoured these formal pay reviews. However, 
while Patrick fretted about her starting salary, Laura explained, independently, how she 
was happy with her initial rate of pay since she had offered to work for free in order to 
make her first step on the ladder. The formal pay reviews were held, thereafter, on an 
annual basis but the directors also awarded ad hoc bonuses for exceptional client work. 
This reflected Patrick’s concern that ComCo pay competitive salaries to retain key staff, 
who were seen as having vital client relationships that would be difficult to replace:
We want to keep people because it’s such a relationship-based business. If you 
were to lose them you are in danger of losing the client because the client likes 
to see that person.
As with Laura, this led to staff receiving pay increases and promotions outside of the 
formal pay review process. These increases were not only informal, they were neither 
sought nor initially anticipated by the staff. Laura, after developing a burgeoning local 
reputation for her work, related her experience:
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We  had  the  team  meeting  in  January  and  we  were  going  through  all  the 
accounts and all the Private Sector ones [had] my name on them, and I think I 
must have looked, been a bit freaked out! Patrick took me outside and said, 
“Oh, you know, we were going to give you a pay rise” and officially… and then 
gave me a letter and it was all in, in there, it had been decided.
However,  this  strategy  was  acknowledged  to  increase  pressure  on  the  business  to 
generate profit in order to afford the salaries. Whilst the perceived consequences of 
losing skilled staff left the owners feeling that they had had little choice, concerns over 
affordability remained and Patrick feared that ComCo could lose staff  as a result of 
limited pay increases in the future, despite no evidence that staff considered leaving or 
required higher salaries. The importance of established relationships and the bespoke 
nature  of  the  work  left  the  owner-managers  unable  to  identify  how  to  recruit  or 
replace such staff.
This  deep belief  in the value of  their most effective staff  members left  the owner-
managers feeling constrained in some of the areas of the business, extending beyond 
pay and rewards. This was most dramatically demonstrated when, while working at a 
client’s  offices,  two senior  specialists  contravened the  client’s  email  policy,  causing 
great embarrassment for ComCo’s directors who were well-known in that sector. Under 
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ComCo’s disciplinary policy Alison and Christina could have been dismissed, something 
Roger was initially determined to do, as much to restore his reputation with the clients 
as to signal that such behaviour in ComCo was unacceptable. 
However, Roger and Patrick also recognized that ComCo must still  deliver the client 
contract and that Alison and Christina were central to this. Neither Alison nor Christina 
campaigned to keep their jobs, yet the owner-managers felt compelled to acquiesce to 
their unspoken interests for fear of jeopardising the project and future work in this 
important sector. Although the option of dismissal was discussed between the owner-
managers,  no formal  or  informal  direct negotiation took place and the matter  was 
quietly dropped. It  seemed as though the owner-managers’  perception of specialist 
employees’  value  ensured  that  their  interests  were  represented  in  management 
discussions,  in  this  case  superseding  company  policy  and  the  owner-managers’ 
immediate personal interests.
SciRec
SciRec  Limited  specializes  in  recruiting  staff  for  scientific  industries,  providing 
associated services such as psychometric testing and interview training. The managing 
director, Alex, had taken voluntary redundancy from his senior recruitment role at a 
major pharmaceutical company and founded the firm in early 2001, three years before 
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the first research visit. He is the sole owner. SciRec serves a small number of clients 
across  Britain  on  a  contractual  basis  rather  than replicating  the more highly  sales-
driven form of ‘high-street’ recruitment agencies. Services are based around a detailed 
understanding of clients’ businesses and strong relationships with the departmental 
managers for whom the services are tailored by SciRec’s consultants. There were two 
consultants at the start of the study and three at its conclusion.
Managing director Alex’s relations with staff were characterized by his dissatisfaction 
and continual attempts to cajole consultants into line. Such frustrations were tempered 
by his nervousness around staff turnover. The extent of consultants’ power stems from 
the company’s reliance not only on their abilities to assess applicants’ technical skill  
and  suitability  for  a  given  role,  but  also  upon  the  relationships  they  develop  with 
managers at client firms. In common with the other participant firms, employees with 
high levels of performance were seen as particularly difficult to recruit, irrespective of 
qualifications  or  experience.  This  led Alex  to offer  these top performers  additional 
benefits  such  as  externally-provided  training  courses  in  order  to  pre-empt  any 
intention to leave, despite no such intentions being indicated.
Consultants’ boundary-testing appeared a common feature of mutual adjustment at 
SciRec and this gradual, contested adaptation could continue over long periods of time. 
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During the first research phase there was an intricate combination of contingent pay 
arrangements. Alex described these schemes as a reward and an incentive for filling 
client vacancies that earned revenue for the firm. However, the consultants perceived 
inequity in the system because, under its complex rules, certain vacancies attracted 
commission while other, similar ones did not. As Kathy, a consultant, explained:
I’m not supposed to claim for that [type of vacancy], but I think people claim for 
it  anyway?  (Researcher:  People  being?)  Erm,  me  and  [colleague]  (laugh). 
Because, you know, we [SciRec] make less of a fee on people coming through 
the [client] website but our argument is that we do exactly the same for those 
candidates as we do for others...
In this way, the consultants were attempting to extend the scope of their financial 
rewards. Alex appeared complicit  in this ‘cheating’ by signing off  these commission 
claims while company performance was on target, effectively accepting their implicit  
demands for increased remuneration. In doing so, Alex undermined his own carefully 
prepared commission  system that  had  been  developed to  reward  and focus  those 
activities he deemed most important to SciRec’s long-term success. The consultants 
adjusted accordingly, assessing their commission rates (and related work) in terms of 
what Alex was willing to sign-off rather than the formal policy. This mutually adjusted 
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practice therefore came about through an unacknowledged process of negotiation in 
which the consultants submitted adjusted claims and gradually established what would 
and would not be accepted.
Concerned  at  the  company’s  declining  performance  against  client  service  level 
agreements,  yet  still  paying  out  commission  for  placements,  Alex  again  became 
frustrated  with  his  employees.  He  eventually  opted  to  completely  overhaul  the 
commission scheme. Working over the Christmas holiday, with only limited input from 
Sharon (operations manager),  Alex redesigned the scheme explicitly in line with his 
current  goals.  The  changes  increased  emphasis  on  client  satisfaction  and,  while 
winning new business would attract a higher rate of commission, filling vacancies at 
existing clients (‘shooting fish in a barrel’ – Sharon) would attract reduced rates. Acting 
in this unilateral fashion, Alex operated as a dominant owner-manager, exercising his 
apparent right to run his business as he saw fit. There was neither engagement with 
staff  nor explicit  acknowledgement of the ways in which the system had previously 
adapted, and what employee beliefs and goals these adaptations had reflected.
The  consultants  learned  of  the  change  at  a  meeting  called  to  announce  its 
implementation. As Sharon recalled, initial reactions were not positive:
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Well,  Kathy  cried.  (INT:  Cried?)  Yes,  she  actually  excused  herself  [from  the 
meeting] and cried in the office. Erm, Lucy got mad...anyway, she was off sick all 
the time.
Although  the  changes  might  reduce  consultants’  earnings,  performance-related 
rewards were provided for the results Alex required. However, the consultants focused 
on those changes that they argued would cost them hundreds of pounds each month 
in  lost  commission.  Three  weeks  after  the  announcement  Alex  described  the 
atmosphere as ‘a bit frosty the snowman’ and, within a couple of months, his changes 
had been quietly dropped. In redesigning the pay system Alex failed to acknowledge 
the potential power held by the consultants at the heart of his business. By assuming 
that, as owner, he had prerogative to unilaterally set pay and commission rates while 
not accounting for consultants’ interests, Alex effectively required the consultants to 
explicitly assert themselves in resisting the changes. 
The previous system that had gradually been adapted through an implicit process of 
mutual adjustment was therefore reinstated after a prolonged campaign of informal, 
small scale resistance from the consultants. However, when  the resistant consultants 
eventually  left  the  firm through unrelated causes,  Alex  found that,  contrary  to  his 
previous fears, replacing them was relatively easy and caused minimal disruption with 
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the firm’s major client. He therefore felt confident in reintroducing the reward scheme 
he had previously been forced to abandon. New employees, seeking to impress Alex 
and not having implicitly negotiated unacknowledged increases in their commission 
claims, expressed little resistance and accepted the scheme without incident.
FinRec
FinRec  Limited  specializes  in  the  recruitment  of  permanent  staff  to  the  largest 
operators in the financial services and consumer credit industry. It was founded in 1994 
by owner-manager Paul who had worked in retail finance and was still involved in this 
industry via a separate business venture. FinRec’s clients have outlets nationwide and 
undertake regular recruitment activities.  The precise nature of the service provided 
depends  on  client  requirements  but  can  involve  recruiting  individuals  or  hiring  an 
entire  team.  While  serving  national  companies,  selection  decisions  depend  upon 
consultants’ understanding of individual managers’ requirements and preferences for 
the successful  placement of candidates.  To succeed,  FinRec’s  nine consultants must 
have an appreciation of the job markets local to their client outlet, local rates of pay 
and also the style  of  the existing team so that  candidates complement those staff 
already in post.
25
FinRec  has  a  strong  emphasis  on  meeting  personal  targets,  including  gentle  ‘peer 
pressure’, recording individual progress in meetings and on notice-boards. In addition 
to the formal commission structure there are regular activities in which performance is 
rewarded  with  alcohol,  reinforcing  a  work  hard/play  hard  culture.  The  highly 
competitive  nature  of  the firm was suggested  by  an  occasion,  now part  of  FinRec 
folklore, when Norma (the operations manager) had to intervene in a competition over 
bottles of spirits that led to heated rows in the office.
Reviewing performance and rewards at FinRec, owner-manager Paul and operations 
manager Norma realized that, while team managers were being paid a higher salary to 
manage team performance in  addition to their  consultant  roles,  this  premium was 
unrelated to their  respective teams’  results.  They wanted to create a link between 
team performance and team managers’ rewards. In considering how to resolve such a 
sensitive matter, Norma explained their approach:
Paul will come up with various options, but I will actually then challenge him, 
and I always say “Right, if I was Jane, or if I was Diane, I wouldn’t be happy with 
that because X, Y, and Z”...So we tend to do it between us and then when we 
came up with the one we finally, hopefully is going to work
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In this instance a decision was made to create an additional  team and focus team 
managers’ bonuses more closely on the performance of their team:
I said, well I think that’s fair, I can’t see why it wouldn’t work. They’re going to  
have smaller teams, we’re not giving them a salary cut, and if somebody said 
the same to me, I’d be laughing me. Same money, less staff, less pressure, I can 
get more bonus if the team do, great! ...there’s a lot of stuff that we talk about  
which doesn’t get filtered down
Taking on the role of Jane and Diane in the thought process, Paul and Norma granted 
the team managers influence in the discussion,  playing-out a negotiation as if they 
were in the room stating their case. By inferring their potential reactions or objections 
to each idea raised, Paul and Norma sought to satisfy Jane and Diane without resort to 
formal discussions or even informal soundings on ideas. It  meant that,  even before 
Jane and Diane considered new proposals, attempts had been made to pre-emptively 
avoid  their  objections.  Thus,  there  is  an  adjustment  taking  place  prior  to  the 
employees’ awareness of the potential changes.
The  nature  of  ongoing,  everyday  mutual  adjustment  at  FinRec can  be seen in  the 
employees’ attitudes towards targets.  Comparisons were made with colleagues and 
targets were decided upon ‘behind’ the official targets, just as individual judgements 
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were made regarding quality, and these idiosyncratic, informal targets were adjusted 
accordingly. As team manager Jane explained:
If  somebody’s  sat  there  and  they’re  doing  eight  CVs  a  week  and  they’re 
thrashing their [revenue] targets,  I’m not going to jump up about 12 CVs. If  
somebody’s done eight CVs, thrashing their target, am I really going to jump up 
and down about it? It, you know, it is a guide...so...announcing 12 CVs [as a 
formal activity target] is what you should be aspiring to but I’d rather see 10 
quality ones rather than 12 naff ones put in [but] Paul would go back to the 
view that, "Well if they can do eight and thrash their targets, why don’t they hit 
12 and do a lot more?" Well, to me it’s...if people are doing eight and exceeding 
their targets...then it’s up to them if they want to push themselves a bit more.
Owner-manager Paul regularly challenges the team managers on the performance of 
certain  consultants  but  allows scope for  team managers  to  defend their  staff  with 
reasons  not  to  dismiss  them,  acting  out  an  ongoing,  informal  negotiation.  Team 
managers then have a mediating role between discussions with Paul concerning the 
implementation of official targets and the negotiation with employees around working 
practices  and  the  enacted,  day-to-day  ‘shadow  targets’.  It  is  within  this  mediating 
position that further mutual adjustment can be seen to occur on an ambiguous, at 
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times implicit,  ongoing basis.  While the revenue target is  the consultants’  principal 
concern,  the  correlation  between  activity  and  revenue  means  that  both  measures 
receive  management  attention,  introducing  further  complexity  to  the  mutual 
adjustment of targets as guides for working practices.
Discussion: The role of intersubjective negotiation in mutual adjustment
Small professional service firms (sPSFs) can be characterized in terms of the degree to 
which  they  hold  tensions  between  the  potentially  competing  interests  of  central 
owner-managers  and their  valuable  specialist  employees,  within  a  context  of  close 
physical and social proximity. This environment produces forms of mutual adjustment 
in  which  policies,  practices  and  relationships  are  gradually,  and  idiosyncratically, 
developed over time through ongoing, everyday forms of both formal and informal 
negotiation. However, explicit forms of interaction and negotiation do not represent a 
full  picture  of  mutual  adjustment.  To fully  understand the development of  working 
practices  and  employment  relationships,  we  suggest  the  relevance  of  processes  of 
intersubjective  negotiation  that  underlie,  and  potentially  undermine,  mutual 
adjustment. 
The  importance  of  intersubjectivity  in  small  firms  is  derived  from  their  particular 
ongoing, everyday interactional employment relationships in which individuals seek to 
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understand  others,  to  make  themselves  understood  and  to  hold  one  another 
accountable  for  these  understandings  (Reich,  2010).  It  is  in  the  context  of  this 
unchoreographed  dance  of  interpretation  and  prediction  (Eden  et  al.,  1981)  that 
employment  relationships  and  working  practices  adjust,  adapt  and  accommodate 
(Schegloff, 1992). In some small firms, the gap between intersubjective perception and 
organizational  realities  may  have  limited  implications  but,  given  the  ambiguity-
intensive  nature  of  professional  service  work,  there  is  greater  scope  for  mutual 
(mis)recognition.  In  sPSFs  there  is  pressure  both  on  individual  staff  and  the 
organizations  themselves  to  prove  their  expertise,  creating  an  environment  where 
‘[b]eing perceived as an expert is as crucial as actually being one’ (Alvesson, 2011b: 
1649). This has important implications for the perception of value and the position of 
influence and power within these firms. 
In our cases, employers’ assessments of employee value, for example in terms of the 
difficulties in replacing them, influenced their actions in attempting to keep them at 
least ‘satisficed’ (Friedlander and Pickle, 1968). In assessing value, employers may have 
few  objective  measures  against  which  to  test  their  perceptions.  Waiting  until  an 
employee leaves to identify the relative difficulties in recruiting replacement staff while 
the business struggles from a shortage of skilled staff is an unattractive option (Ram, 
1999a). Likewise, testing whether clients will take their business elsewhere should a 
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particular employee leave represents a gamble for a business relying on few clients. In 
our  study,  owner-managers  did  not  acknowledge  or  seek  to  address  this  problem, 
confidently  relying  instead on  their  own perception  of  valuable  expertise  that  had 
developed in their particular sPSF context.
Of  course,  the  owner-managers  remained  sensitive  to  client  feedback  and  the 
relationships  employees  developed  with  those  clients  heavily  influenced  the 
perception of value. However, little was done to gather detailed feedback or to explore 
the quality  of  the relationships  in  any systematic  way.  It  is  therefore  not  only  any 
‘objective’ state of external factors that influences the development of employment 
relationships within the firm but the perception of these factors by the relevant actors,  
in negotiation with their intersubjective assumptions of the perceptions of the parties 
they  are  interacting  with.  In  our  firms,  the  perceived  value  and  substitutability  of 
specialist  employees  was  not  simply  a  matter  of  qualifications  or  other  objective 
measures but related to the ambiguous value attached to the somewhat intangible, 
bespoke nature of the services provided. 
While  owner-managers  worked  in  close  proximity  to  their  employees,  promoting 
familiarity  and  opportunities  for  monitoring  work  and  behaviour,  the  ambiguities 
around the bespoke service work often limited the extent to which these managers 
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could directly involve themselves or assess performance. As a result, several employees 
perceived  as  invaluable  by  owner-managers  were  observed  to  appear  to  exert 
influence  over  their  pay  and  conditions.  In  this  way,  these  employees  could,  for 
example, breach existing policies without sanction, even to the potentially longer-term 
detriment of the firm. Frequently, no explicit negotiations over the consequences of 
such actions were engaged in. Instead,  negotiations seem to have often developed 
intersubjectively,  for  example,  owner-managers  weighing-up  their  projected 
alternatives, making assumptions about the client or employees’ beliefs and intentions. 
The results of this process would then be interpreted by employees and both parties 
would adjust, adapt and accommodate accordingly.
However, in responding to their interpretations and predictions, owner-managers were 
observed  to  offer  the  minimum  concessions  they  felt  sufficient.  By  satisficing  the 
workers’  perceived  needs,  the traditionally  dominant  owner-manager  may hope  to 
remove or reduce the motivation for their employees to act as explicit negotiators. For 
example, at FinRec Paul and Norma modified proposed changes to team managers’ 
income structure  in  order  to  make  it  more  acceptable  to  the  team  managers  and 
thereby avoid conflict with these key employees. The ‘adjustment’ was made on the 
basis of Paul and Norma’s best guess as to what Diane and Jane would accept. This 
intersubjective guessing game is distinct from Paul and Norma simply considering the 
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effects of management decisions on staff because their consideration was motivated 
by securing management interests through avoiding dispute rather than concern with 
Jane and Diane’s opinions per sé.
We suggest that such strategies may be particularly prominent in small firms. Where 
employment  relationships  are  conducted  in  close  physical  proximity,  explicit 
negotiations may upset familial, interpersonal relationships between interdependent 
owner-managers and employees as the raw power dynamics of the firm are laid bare 
(Goss,  1991;  Ram,  1999a,  1999b),  no  longer  obscured  by  the  informality  and 
friendliness  of  day-to-day  collaboration  (Scott  et  al.,  1989).  Further,  in  small  PSFs 
explicitness may create greater pressure to justify ambiguity-intensive skills or outputs 
and interdependency in the employment relationship may blur the balance of power 
within the firm, leaving neither party certain of their position relative to the other. In 
such circumstances, success in an explicit negotiation may secure your interests and 
affirm your position as having power but at the expense of pleasant working relations 
and  adaptive  cooperation.  Failure  in  such  a  negotiation,  your  relative  weakness 
explicitly  revealed,  could  lead  to  a  rout  in  which  your  interests  become  largely 
discounted.
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The negotiation that takes place between owner-managers and employees is therefore 
informed  by  their  ongoing  intersubjective  guessing  games  rather  than  by  explicit 
engagement alone. In our participant firms this led to an ad hoc, unspoken mutual 
adjustment and adaptation of working practices and employment relationships. In the 
absence  of  explicit  negotiations,  recognized  by  all  parties  where  ‘stakes’  can  be 
discussed until  a mutually acceptable value is  reached,  the significance attached to 
various  actions  or  comments  relies  heavily  on  mutual  (mis)interpretation  and 
(mis)recognition.  Uncertain  as  to what  might  satisfy  employees (Nadin and Cassell, 
2007), owner-managers guess, conceding something to them in the hope that they will  
at least be satisficed. While employees may therefore obtain certain concessions from 
the owner-manager, the absence of explicit  negotiation means that employees may 
not recognize such concessions as benefits; the owner-manager’s concession may not 
therefore influence their attitudes or practices. Neither owner-manager nor employees 
see their interests as being served, however the concessional alteration may continue 
to operate.
Any gains that are made by employees through intersubjective negotiation are informal 
and without guarantee, even if accepted as custom and practice in the firm. However, 
such informality does not preclude individuals being held accountable to the mutual 
(mis)recognition  that  surrounds  such  adaptation  or  adjustment.  Implicit  rules  and 
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understandings (Brown et al.,  2010) and unspoken expectations (Nadin and Cassell, 
2007) are an outcome of this intersubjectively engaged mutual adjustment process. 
This  was  most  clearly  played-out  in  the  present  study  in  terms  of  the  ‘shadow’ 
commission rates at SciRec and ‘shadow’ targets at FinRec. In both cases, particular 
expectations that were not formally or even explicitly agreed upon but developed from 
a  series  of  assumptions  and unacknowledged adaptations,  undermining  the formal 
policies  that  were  in  place.  Thus,  intersubjective  negotiation  arrived  at  provisional 
‘shadow agreements’ that had crucial implications for performance within these firms.
As processes of mutual adjustment, these intersubjectively negotiated guessing games 
and shadow agreements  can encounter  elements  of  dysfunction that  influence the 
organization’s development. Adaptations made on the basis of guesswork may require 
company  resources  but  still  be  unnecessary  and  unsuccessful,  potentially  creating 
frustrations  in  the  employment  relationship  and  increasing  pressure  on  the 
organization. This matters to informal, adhocractic environments such as those in sPSFs 
because  there  may  be  few  formal  mechanisms  effectively  setting  out  a  basis  for 
decisions or more explicit, formal negotiations. Furthermore, with owner-managers in 
close proximity to employees the environment lends itself to regular, ongoing, informal 
adaptation. An  intersubjective  guessing  game  around  the  nature  of  power  and 
alternatives  within  the  organization  can  lead  employees  and  employers  to  seek  to 
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become more likeable, more in-tune with what is perceived to be required to maintain 
one’s competitive advantage. Intersubjectivity can therefore form the basis of a mutual 
adjustment that frequently reacts or (re)negotiates, coming to underlie, and potentially 
undermine, more explicit forms of negotiation around the employment relationship.
Currently,  research into small  firms,  and sPSFs,  is  primarily  concerned with explicit 
actors whose interests, the pursuit of those interests and the negotiation required for 
their achievement, can be identified (Nadin and Cassell, 2007; Ram and Edwards, 2003: 
722). We argue that explicit instances of (in)formal negotiation cannot be understood 
as discrete events disassociated from ongoing, everyday intersubjective negotiations. 
The  mutually  adjusting  nature  of  employment  relationships  and  working  practices 
emerges as a result of this intersubjective negotiation as parties seek to secure their  
interests  without  recourse  to  potentially  problematic  explicit  negotiation.  These 
negotiations have important consequences for the organization as they give rise to 
potentially dysfunctional outcomes that satisfy neither owner-manager nor employee 
interests.
Conclusion
This  paper  has  addressed  the  under-researched  and  under-developed  concept  of 
mutual adjustment in sPSFs. This is partly in response to the need for a more balanced, 
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context-sensitive understanding of the nuances of employment relationships in small 
firms (Blackburn, 2005; Harney and Dundon, 2006). We have argued that the mutual 
adjustment that develops from explicit instances of (in)formal negotiation cannot be 
understood as  discrete  events  disassociated  from ongoing,  everyday  intersubjective 
negotiations.  We  found  that,  frequently,  there  were  only  very  limited  explicit 
negotiations over the development of employment relationships or working practices. 
In  negotiating,  for  example,  around  an  employee’s  pay,  owner-managers  would 
frequently  base  this  on  the  employee’s  perceived  value  and  not  on  any  direct 
engagement with that employee. In assessing this value, employers had few objective 
measures available and rarely attempted to find or develop them, confidently relying 
instead on their own perception of valuable expertise. There need not be any ‘real’ 
value  conferred  by  an  individual’s  skills  or  place  within  the  organization.  We have 
suggested that it is therefore not only any ‘objective’ state of external factors, such as 
the  labour  market,  that  influences  the  development  of  employment  relationships 
within the firm but the perception of an individual or situation by those in negotiation 
with  them.  In  this  context,  some  employees  received  pay  rises  or  other  bonuses 
without seeking or expecting them. Mutual adjustment can therefore become founded 
on a largely unspoken, intersubjective guessing game.
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We suggest  that  this  may be particularly  prominent  in  small  firms,  and ambiguity-
intensive  sPSFs,  where  employment  relationships  are  conducted  in  close  physical 
proximity and explicit negotiations may expose the raw power dynamics of the firm, no 
longer  obscured  by  the  informality  and  friendliness  of  day-to-day  collaboration. 
Explicitness  may also create  greater  pressure  to  justify  ambiguity-intensive  skills  or 
outputs and interdependency in the employment relationship may blur the balance of 
power within the firm, leaving neither party certain of their position relative to the 
other. In the absence of explicit negotiations, recognized by all parties where ‘stakes’ 
can be discussed until a mutually acceptable value is reached, the significance attached 
to  various  actions  or  comments  relies  heavily  on  mutual  (mis)interpretation  and 
(mis)recognition. However, such informal, adhocratic development does not preclude 
individuals being held accountable to the mutual (mis)recognition that surrounds such 
adaptation  or  adjustment.  Implicit  rules  and  understandings  and  unspoken 
expectations  are  an  outcome  of  this  intersubjectively  engaged  mutual  adjustment 
process.
These findings have important implications for practitioners because they emphasise 
that everyday actions can be vested with significance and form processes of ongoing 
negotiation regardless of whether they are intended as such. Negotiations around the 
employment relationship are influenced by parties’ intersubjective assessment of their 
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power position relative to others in the organization and therefore their sense of how 
far their interests are satisfied or others’ interests accommodated in everyday actions. 
Potentially  dysfunctional or maladaptive ‘shadow agreements’ can therefore develop 
within firms that may undermine explicit policies and practices and become especially 
problematic as firms seek to grow and to introduce greater degrees of formality. By 
viewing  mutual  adjustment  as  informed  by  and  informing  these  intersubjective 
negotiations, parties to an unspoken ‘deal’ might only learn of the bargain through its 
breach, when the aggrieved party explicitly draws attention to what had been ‘agreed’.
This  raises  questions  for  practitioners  about  how  conduct  in  the  workplace  is 
interpreted  by  others  and  how  these  factors  influence  working  relationships  and 
practices.  It  means  that  attempts  to  explicitly  negotiate  around  an  aspect  of  the 
employment  relationship  need  to  be  understood  in  light  of  any  existing  implicit 
agreements that may have formed over time. Failing to consider how current practices 
may  represent  ‘agreements’  to  one  party  risks  provoking  open  and  disruptive 
negotiation  as  that  party  seeks  to  explicitly  assert  its  subjectively  understood 
assessment of its bargaining power in the organization.
There  are  many  opportunities  for  future  research,  for  example  investigating  how 
processes of mutual adjustment relating to specialists compare to other employees in 
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the same firms.  There are  interesting questions to consider regarding whether  our 
findings could be extended to different types of sPSF as well as other types of SME and 
possibly  larger  professional  organizations,  together  with  comparative  cross-cultural 
studies informed by different approaches to employee relationships. One important 
implication of our findings for researchers is the need for sensitivity to intersubjective 
forms of negotiation that may not always be recognized by research participants and 
thus may elude researchers. Explicit  incidences of (in)formal negotiations should be 
understood  as  occurring  within  a  context  of  everyday,  ongoing  intersubjective 
negotiation that informs mutual adjustment. We suggest that this requires a shift to 
greater depth in  the study of  individuals’  perceptions and the ways  in which their  
relative positions are structured in intersubjective mutual (mis)recognition.
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Appendix: Table 1
Company Sector Activities Employees Data Collection Interviews in phase one
Contact in 
intervening period Interviews in phase two
ComCo
Communications 
firm based in 
Northern England, 
clients nationwide.
Media / public 
relations, design 
and 
communications
Focused initially on 
local small businesses 
and local authorities 
across UK. Latterly has 
moved into 
representing 
international clients’ 
UK operations 
alongside local 
authority work, less 
small firms work
14 in both 
phases plus 
associate staff as 
required (some 
personnel 
changes)
Initial meeting to agree 
access. Observations (93 
hours on-site), semi-
structured interviews, 
reading company 
documentation; informal 
discussions before / after 
normal working day
5
(1x owner, 3x 
account 
manager, 1x 
designer)
Meeting with 
managing director, 
e-mail contact with 
(former) director
9
(managing director, 2x 
directors, 3x account 
manager, marketing 
manager, marketing 
assistant, design manager)
SciRec
Recruitment firm 
based in Eastern 
England, clients 
nationwide. 
Recruitment Specializing in 
recruitment of staff for 
science industry clients
6 in both phases 
(although 
personnel had 
changed)
Initial meeting to agree 
access. Observations 
(142 hours on-site), semi-
structured interviews, 
reading company 
documentation, company 
team meetings, after 
work social activities 
6
(owner, 2x 
consultants, 
operations 
manager, 2x 
administrators)
Meeting with 
owner, telephone 
contact with owner, 
e-mail contact with 
operations manager 
and other staff 
members
6
(owner, 3x consultants, 
recruitment manager, 
administrator)
FinRec
Recruitment firm 
based in Northern 
England, clients 
nationwide. 
Recruitment Specializing in 
recruitment of staff for 
financial services 
industry
16 (phase one)
12 (phase two)
Initial meeting to agree 
access. Observations 
(113 hours on-site), semi-
structured interviews, 
reading company 
documentation, informal 
discussions over lunch 
times and breaks
8
(operations 
manager, 2x 
team leaders, 4x 
consultants, 
administration 
supervisor)
Meeting with 
owner and 
operations 
manager, e-mail 
contact with owner
1*
(former team leader)
*informal conversations 
were held with a variety of 
team members over the 
two week on-site period, 
e.g. lunch breaks and in 
the normal course of work
Table 1 : Summary of data collection
